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Appellants

respectfully

petition

the

court

for

a

rehearing of that portion of the case which pertains to appellants'
claim against respondents for the monies placed on deposit and
otherwise invested in Grove Finance once the cease and desist order
had been issued by the respondents.

This matter was not specifi-

cally addressed by the opinion issued in this case and appears to
be a matter which is outside the scope of the case of Gillman v.
Department of Financial Institutions, 120 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1989),
cited K y the court.

This petition is submitted in good faith and

not for delay.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE ACT OF ENFORCING A CEASE AND DESIST ORDER
IS DIFFERENT THAN SUSPENDING OR REVOKING A LICENSE
In the instant case, this court has now ruled that
governmental immunity protects the respondents from suit because
the conduct complained of by appellants related to a failure to
suspend or revocate Grove Finance's license.

While that may be

true of a majority of appellants' claims, a certain number of the
appellants had, as an additional cause of action against respondents, a claim that during the period from the time the cease and
- 1-

desist order was issued by respondents on April 8, 1980 until the
bankruptcy of Grove Finance in August of 1980 (or at least until
the takeover of Grove Finance by respondents

in late July),

respondents allowed Grove Finance to take money on deposit and
otherwise engage in activities in specific contravention of the
cease and desist order.

(See Appellants' Brief at page 25 and

appellant Hilton's amended complaint, Third Cause of Action.)
Admittedly not all of the appellants can allege this cause of
action and the amount so received by Grove Finance which would be
claimed as damages in this case is a very small portion of the
monies claimed in the total lawsuit.

Nevertheless, this specific

claim deserves to be addressed because it represents a separate
cause of action. It appears that this court, in making its ruling,
overlooked this small but important claim.
There is a major difference between a governmental agency
on the one hand making a decision whether and to what extent to
suspend or revoke a financial institution's license and on the
other hand to enforce its own order.

Once the decision was made

by respondents that Grove Finance was improperly and illegally
taking funds on deposit, it entered a cease and desist order. For
reasons of its own, it did not make the cease and desist order
public.

The only way, therefore, that the public

(for whose

benefit the cease and desist order was issued) would be protected
- 2 -

would be for respondents to undertake such actions as to make
certain that the cease and desist order was enforced.

It is the

allegation of appellants that respondents did not do that. Rather,
even with the cease and desist order in place, officials of Grove
Finance took monies on deposit from some of the appellants and
continued to violate the cease and desist order until on July 18,
1980 (over three months later) when respondents took possession of
Grove Finance. During this period of more than three months, some
appellants placed additional monies or new monies on deposit with
Grove Finance.
To enforce the cease and desist order did not require a
determination of suspending or revoking a license. Rather it could
have been accomplished in a myriad of ways.

Among other things,

respondents could have placed personnel in Grove Finance's offices
to personally prevent any more monies from being placed with Grove
Finance in exchange for a Grove Finance obligation.

Respondents

could have also posted a notice on the premises informing the
public that, until further notice, Grove Finance was not permitted
to take monies on deposit or otherwise receive monies in exchange
for obligations of Grove Finance.

Respondents could also have

imposed a series of fines every time a violation was detected.

In

other words, once the cease and desist order was issued, it did not
require respondents to shut down Grove Finance but rather it
- 3-

required respondents to enforce the order. As it was, respondents
imposed the cease and desist order and then completely failed to
enforce the order.

At the same time the public was not informed

as to the existence of the cease and desist order and therefore
during the three month period certain of the appellants continued
to make deposits and otherwise provide money to Grove Finance in
exchange for obligations of Grove.

Since appellants claim that

respondents were negligent in this regard, they should be permitted
to go to trial on the issue.

POINT II
ENFORCEMENT OF THE CEASE AND DESIST ORDER WAS MINISTERIAL
The

definition

of

ministerial

versus

discretionary

governmental functions is well briefed in appellants' briefs.
Suffice it to say, once the cease and desist order was in place,
i.e., once the discretionary decision had been made to issue a
cease and desist order, thereafter the enforcement of the cease and
desist order was ministerial. The instructions were clear - Grove
Finance was ordered not to undertake activities which would bring
monies or other assets into Grove Finance in exchange for Grove
obligations. That was an order without discretion and respondents
had the duty to enforce it.

They did not and so should be held

liable for the damages incurred by appellants as a direct result.
- 4 -

Therefore, there has been a waiver of governmental immunity for the
respondents' negligent conduct as to that aspect of the case.
The claim of appellants in this regard is virtually
identical to the facts in the case of Little v. Utah State Division
of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (1983).

In that case this court

determined that the Division of Family Services had the discretionary right to determine whether a particular individual was a
candidate for a foster care program. However, once they determined
that the child was such a candidate, then this court held that the
governmental agency had a ministerial duty to make certain that the
child was properly cared for. The failure to properly care for the
child resulting in the child's death became the basis for the
lawsuit and this court held that immunity had been waived.
Assuming that the decision to place Jennifer
in a foster home was a discretionary one, once
that decision was made and the placement
occurred, the question was no longer whether
the child was to receive foster care but
whether due care was exercised under a duty
assumed. Where a breach of that duty can be
shown, the government is held to the same
standard as private individuals and cannot
cloak itself with the mantle of discretion.
Id. at 51.
In like vein, respondents could use their discretion to determine
whether a cease and desist order should be imposed, but once having
so exercised that discretion, they had a duty to enforce the order.
- 5 -

Their negligent conduct in failing to do so gives rise to a waiver
of immunity,

SUMMARY
Even under the authority of Gillman, supra governmental
immunity does not shield the respondents under those circumstances
where the remedy is other than revoking or suspending the license
and a ministerial act is involved. It is submitted that this court
has overlooked the specific claim of appellants with regard to
respondents'

failure to enforce

its cease and desist order.

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the District Court with
instructions to permit trial on the issue of respondents' negligence in failing to enforce the cease and desist order.
DATED this 3 0

day of November, 1989.
Respectfully submitted,
KESLER & RUST
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